We conduct a Multi-Principal-Agent experiment to determine whether market structure affects intermediary behavior. The intermediaries (Agents) are perfectly informed regarding project types and can recommend that Principals either proceed or discontinue with a project. Agents earn revenues only when they recommend to continue. We find that monopolist Agents protect the interests of Principals better than when Agents compete. Our findings are robust to a significant fee increase.
Introduction
In 2016, Wells Fargo Bank, one of the largest financial services companies in the United States, faced public outrage because its employees opened over two million unauthorized accounts. Some of the former employees said that they opened these unauthorized accounts to reach monthly sales quotas and that management tacitly approved the deceptive practices. Instances of deceptive behavior in financial services has been documented in Egan et al. (2016) , who determine that one in eight financial advisors have a misconduct on their record, and in Cohen et al. (2014) , who use an experimental approach to show that banking cultural norms deter honesty.
This suggests that there is latent deceptive behavior that exists in financial markets. According to Akerlof and Shiller (2015) , competitive markets may actually contribute to dishonest behavior by tying profit, to a certain extent, to deception. Thus, the norms in the financial/banking sector can be shaped by the tough competition in the sector or, in other words, by the market structure.
In this paper, we formally test the hypothesis whether market structure has an impact on deceptive behavior using a controlled laboratory environment. We design a Multi-Principal-Agent game and find that competition among financial advisers undermines moral behavior when clients fully trust their recommendations. We also conclude that our findings are robust to a 300 percent increase in fees for the monopolist Agent.
Our design assumes that financial advisers (Agents) manage portfolios on behalf of the clients (Principals) for which they receive a fee (Asset Under Management fee or AUM). Agents can recommend that the Principals either Continue or Stop the investment project, which can be either high value (assets) or low value (assets). Though the Principals would prefer to invest only in high value projects, they cannot accurately observe whether the project is high value or low value until the end of the game. Agents, on the other hand, can perfectly observe the project type before issuing a recommendation.
The Principals in our game are gullible. They are robots that completely trust Agent recommendations. While this assumption may appear extreme, it is standard in other theoretical work that we discuss below and, more importantly, it permits us to focus solely on Agent motivation and behavior between two market structures: monopoly and competition.
The monopoly structure in our experiment is fairly simple. Each Agent randomly meets a Principal. The Agent only collects revenue if the recommendation is to invest in the project. In the competitive structure, each Agent may advise up to three Principals, depending on the actions of other Agents. The game in the competitive structure proceeds as follows: each Agent is matched with a Principal, and if an Agent in the initial assignment recommends to stop, then those Principals are reassigned to another Agent whose rec-ommendation is to invest. Note that the possible revenue in the competitive environment is three times higher than in the monopoly market. For this reason, we design another monopoly market in which the fee is 300 percent higher than in the baseline monopoly market. Thus, the monetary incentives for Agents are aligned in both competitive and high-fee monopoly structures.
We find that misconduct in the competitive structure is 29 percentage points higher than in the baseline monopoly structure. Our result is robust to the increase of fee adopted in the high-fee monopoly market. We also cannot reject the hypothesis that the likelihood of misconduct is the same in our two monopoly structures at a five percent significance level.
Our experimental design captures key elements of theoretical models studying the behavior of money managers, certifiers or rating agencies. Dasgupta and Piacentino (2015) analyze how equity blockholders affect corporate governance. In their model, blockholders are money managers who receive AUM fees and are able to observe the actions of the management in the firms they invest in. Good money managers are more likely to hold blocks in firms without agency problems and money managers who sell shares of poorly managed firms are more likely to be bad money managers. Inherent in this setup is a conflict of interest. When money managers sell shares of poorly managed firms, they signal investors that the quality of their portfolios is lower than anticipated, which leads investors to change money managers. As a result, the revenues of these money managers will decrease. In our laboratory experiment, money managers similarly have an incentive not to announce under-performing firms in their portfolio.
A less obvious feature that our design captures is the ratings shopping phenomenon present in the certifier or rating agency market. Bolton et al. (2012) illustrate how competition in the rating agency market can lead to inefficient outcomes because sellers will only pay for favorable ratings when buyers are gullible. The effect of ratings shopping appears in our experimental design in the form of funds being redirected to Agents that recommend to continue, which occurs at a higher rate in the competitive market. According to our results, ratings shopping deteriorates the efficiency of markets, and therefore we are able to provide further evidence on the somehow ambiguous role of competition in rating services as surveyed by Dranove and Jin (2010) .
The next section presents our game using the assumption of a profit-maximizing Agent. In section 3, we describe in detail our experimental procedure and in section 4 we present the results for monopoly, monopoly-high and competitive markets. We conclude with a discussion of our results in section 5. The appendix includes instructions given to the subjects as well as the information on the user-interface used in the experimental sessions.
The Multi-Principal-Agent Game
In our environment, there are two types of players: Principals and Agents. Each Principal begins the game with 100 point initial endowment, which they can invest in either a blue b (high value) project or a red r (low value) project. The project state space is w 2 {b, r}.
Both projects are equally likely to occur and require an investment of 100 points each. Principals investing in a b type project earn 200 points (100 net change on initial investment) while Principals investing in a r type project earn 100 points (no net change on initial investment). Principals are profit-maximizing individuals who prefer to invest in b type projects. However, they cannot cannot determine project type until after their investment decision.
Agents, on the other hand, are able to observe with certainty whether the project is b or r before making a recommendation. An Agent's action set is a 2 {c, s}, where c is a recommendation to continue and s is a recommendation to stop. In other words, an Agent can either recommend that a Principal continues (c) with the investment opportunity or that they stop (s). Agents collect a fee (f ) for overseeing and servicing the investment. Thus, an Agent will earn 100 ⇥ f if and only if she recommends c. We assume that the Principal is naïve and blindly trusts Agent recommendation. Equation 1 summarizes Agent A's profit possibilities and shows that the payoff for recommending c varies across market structures. In the monopoly market, there are two treatments: (i) the monopoly treatment (MT) where the fee is 10 percent of the initial investment value and (ii) the monopoly high-fee treatment (MHT) where the fee is 30 percent of the initial investment value. In the competitive market, there is only one competitive treatment (CT) where the fee is set at 10 percent of the initial investment value. Therefore, the fee varies by treatment such that f 2 {0.1, 0.3}.
In the CT, each Agent is assigned to a subgroup, comprised of three Agents. All Agents within the subgroup then compete to provide investment recommendations to the Principals. Initially, each of the three Agents is randomly matched with a Principal, to serve as an investment adviser. If an Agent recommends c to the Principal, then the Principal will invest. If an Agent recommends s, then her principal will be randomly assigned to one of the two remaining Agents in that subgroup. If the next Agent recommends c, then the Principal will invest with that Agent. If only one Agent recommends c while the other two recommend s, then the Agent recommending c will earn the highest possible profit (100 ⇥ 0.3).
In the baseline MT and CT treatments, we set the fee f = 0.1. Therefore, when an Agent recommends c in the MT, the profit is calculated as 100 ⇥ 0.1. In the CT, the final profit of an Agent who recommends c depends on the fee collected from the initially assigned Principal, as well as the number of added Principals when the other Agents within the same subgroup recommend s. Agents in the CT can earn a maximum 30 points when one Agent recommends c while the other two recommend s. For robustness, we also test the effect of f = 0.3 in the MHT. In all treatments, when an Agent recommends s, the profit for that Agent is zero. Equation 2 summarizes Principal P's profit possibilities and shows that the final profit depends on the Agent's decision and the project type.
Since strategy c always yields higher profit, the unique Nash equilibrium requires that an Agent play c regardless of project type, fee rate or group matching environment (treatment). This is summarized by Prediction 1.
Prediction 1 Regardless of market structure and project type, an Agent will always choose to continue. Note that Prediction 1 assumes a profit-maximizing Agent who compares the payoff of playing c against the payoff of playing s. According to equation (1), playing c will always yield higher profit, regardless of market structure and project type. Therefore, a profit-maximizing Agent should always play c.
However, this is not always the case. For example, Gneezy (2005) and more recently Lopez-Perez and Spiegelman (2013) found that subjects prefer being honest even when there are material negative consequences. In literature, this behavior is known as "lie aversion." In our Multi-Principal-Agent game, the alternative hypothesis is that an Agent will choose s after observing w = r due to lie aversion.
Procedures
Subjects were recruited through the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE) (Greiner, 2004) . Seventy-nine subjects participated in the experiments at the "Econ Lab" at Bates College. The pool of subjects included undergraduate students and staff members from various majors and departments.
All recruited participants were assigned to the role of Agents. As discussed above, we assume that the Principals are naïve and fully trust the Agents' recommendations. Thus, in this experiment, the Principals are automated (robots).
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three treatments: (i) MT, where f = 0.1, (ii) MHT, where f = 0.3, and (iii) CT, where f = 0.1. We provide screen shots of the user interface in Appendix B, which was designed using oTree (Chen, et al., 2016) . In order to analyze the impact of competition on Agent behavior, the treatments follow a between subject design.
As shown in Table 1 , 21 subjects participated in the MT game, 22 subjects participated in the MHT game, and 36 subjects participated in the CT game. Each session lasted 20 rounds. Since this is a simplified game with limited action space, we chose to keep the number of rounds low to avoid game fatigue. Overall, we ran three MT sessions, three MHT sessions and four CT sessions. Each round in the MT and MHT sessions proceeded as follows:
Stage 1: Agents observe project type and choose whether to continue c or stop s. Stage 2: After selecting c or s, Agents observe current round payoff, p A , as well as all previous decisions and respective payoffs (history). In the CT treatment, we randomly assign nine Agents to one of the three subgroups, making sure that every group is unique in all rounds throughout the session. The user interface is similar to the one used in the monopoly treatments, except that the interface also displays the number of Agents who chose c in the second stage. According to equation (1), the number of agents who choose c affects the distribution of profit and is therefore relevant information for players.
Appendix A contains the instructions for CT that were read to the participants at the beginning of each session. 1 All subjects were paid a $5 show-up fee. The final payment to subjects was calculated using the sum of points earned from two randomly selected periods at the exchange rate of $4 per 10 points plus the show-up fee. On average, sessions lasted just under 40 minutes.
Results
Since 98 percent or more of b projects result in a recommendation to continue (Table 1) , we focus our analysis on states where Agents observe a r project. The left panel in Figure  1 Result 1 Agents in the CT choose to continue more often than Agents in the MT and MHT after observing a low value r project .
We calculate the mean continuation choice for each subject by dividing the total number of c choices per subject by the total number of rounds when the state is r. We then use the mean continuation choice to construct the CDF for each treatment, which is shown in the right panel of Figure 1 . Using subject data, we find that the difference between the median MT and the median CT is about 50 percentage points and the difference between the median MHT and median CT is about 20 percentage points. Since 50 percent of the MT subjects always continue, the median continuation rate for the CT is 100 percent.
Considering that the fee in the MHT is 300 percent higher than the fee in the MT, the fact that the difference in the mean continuation choice is not greater between the MT and the MHT is remarkable. Though the MHT median choice c could have increased by 100 percent above the MT median, it only increased by roughly 60 percent.
Also, according to the CDF, at low continuation rates, the probability mass in the MT and MHT is quite similar while at higher continuation rates, the probability mass is higher in the MHT than in the MT. However, when we perform the Wald test to see if the continuation rates in MT and MHT are equivalent, we fail to reject the hypothesis (see Result 2 below).
Overall, compared to MT and MHT, the results in the CT are skewed toward choice c. Likewise, at low continuation rates, the CDF densities under MT and MHT are lower than in the CT. Thus, despite the fact that an Agent can earn up to 30 points each period in the CT, which is equivalent to the profit in the MHT, the higher rate of continuation in the CT is not solely driven by higher monetary incentives.
Next, we perform a logit estimation to formally test whether there is a difference in subject choices when they are assigned to either a monopolistic or competitive market structure. Table 2 summarizes these results. Choice c is our model's dependent variable. The independent variables MT and MHT are dummies that capture the treatment effects. In our specification, the constant captures the CT effect, the MT variable captures the MT effect, and the MHT variable captures the MHT effect. Computed using a bootstrap method, our estimation includes subject random effects and clustered standard errors at session level for the competitive market structure and at subject level for the monopolistic market structure. Specification (I) reports estimation results when all observations are included and specification (II) reports estimation results when only low value r projects are included. In specification (I), the coefficient on the constant is 0.93, which indicates that the likelihood of an Agent choosing c in the CT is 93 percent. Compared to the CT, the likelihood of choosing c in the MT decreases by 16 percentage points, and the likelihood of choosing c in the MHT decreases by 10 percentage points. Specification (II) shows that when we restrict our sample size to red states only, an Agent in the CT will choose c 87 percent of the time. The likelihood of choosing c decreases by 29 percentage points for an Agent in the MT and by 20 percentage points for an Agent in the MHT.
Result 2 Agents in MHT who receive high fees (f = 0.3) do not chose to continue more often than Agents in the MT who receive low fees (f = 0.1) after observing a low value r project.
We perform a Wald test to determine whether the likelihood that an Agent will choose c is the same in the MT and the MHT. Recall that Agents in the MHT receive higher fees and therefore can earn 300 percent higher profits than the Agents in the MT. Furthermore, the profit in the MHT is equivalent to the highest possible profit in the CT, where the final payoff depends on the number of continuing Agents. We fail to reject the hypothesis that the likelihood of choosing c is the same in the MT and the MHT, at a five percent significance level.
Discussion
In this study, we compare the behavior of Agents under two distinct market structures: (i) competitive and (ii) monopolistic. We find that Agents are more likely to tell the truth in the less competitive environment (MT), even when we significantly increase the profitability from misreporting (MHT). In the competitive market, Agents who observe a low value r asset are 29 percent more likely to misreport than the Agents in the monopoly market. Our findings imply that competition can significantly affect Agent behavior and market morals.
To test the robustness of our results, we include a high fee treatment for the monopoly market. In this treatment, Agent earnings are equivalent to the maximum amount that can be earned in the competitive treatment. Even though the fee is 300 percent higher than in the baseline monopoly treatment and Agents are likely to earn more than in the competitive treatment, Agents still misreport more often in the competitive environment. Agents are likely to earn the most in the high-fee monopoly treatment because when all Agents in the competitive treatment choose to misreport, they earn the same as an Agent who misreports in the baseline (low-fee) monopoly treatment.
There are two possible behavioral reasons for our results: (i) people prefer to win without consideration for the morality of their actions and (ii) people dislike seeing others get ahead, especially by cheating. Note that our experimental design cannot help us to identify the explanation that is most appropriate in this case. Further work is needed in order to adequately identify the drivers of moral behavior. Overall, our results indicate that policies recommending competition in financial services should be studied carefully. Moreover, such policies may need to be complemented with others that observe and impose penalties on misconduct.
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For very helpful comments and suggestions, we are indebted to Aleksandr Alekseev, Dan They do, however, know that the project is blue with the probability of 50% and red with the probability of 50%. The intermediaries (you) each have access to information regarding project type. As an intermediary, you can collect a fee for your recommendation, that is worth 10 percent of the initial investment.
After observing the project type and the value associated with it, the intermediary makes a recommendation to the client. If you recommend to proceed, you will collect 10 percent of the initial investment value. If you advise the client to stop, or pull out of the project, you will not earn any points. Your earnings will depend on the number of clients you have, which depends on the action of the other intermediary. That is, if you continue while other intermediaries in your group decide to pull out, your earnings will increase based on the number of clients reallocated to you. Similarly, when you decide to stop while other intermediaries continue, your clients will be reallocated to those continuing.
Each round will consist of 2 stages. Stage 1: The three intermediaries in each group receive information on the project. Each must then decide how to advise the client. If an intermediary advises the client to stop, then they will not earn any points. If an intermediary advises the client to continue then they will collect points, based on payoffs described below.
Stage 2: All players view the outcome of the round. They will see the decision and outcome of each player. The intermediaries will see the choice of the other intermediaries based on the number of clients they end up with and will also have access to the record of their own decisions made throughout the rounds. EARNINGS Your earnings will be computed according to the formula for your role: Intermediaries: Earnings of a Continuing Intermediary = 10% ⇥ Your clientâs Investment + 10% ⇥ Other clients Investments whose Intermediary stopped / continuing intermediaries Earnings of a Stopping Intermediary = 0 Clients: Earnings of a Continuing Client = Value -Fee Total Blue 200 -10 = 190 Red 100 -10 = 90 Earnings of the Stopping Client = Initial Investment = 100 There are 9 participants in this session. There will be 3 groups at any point. Every round you will be rematched with different players. While you will not know who you are playing with, you will end up interacting with players more than once. No two groups you participate in will have exactly the same people.
The points you earn from 2 randomly selected rounds will be added up, exchanged into
